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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000855

SIPDIS

DOHA FOR ROB PYOTT (PLEASE PASS TO A/S RADEMAKER DELEGATION)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016

TAGS: PREL PGOV IS IR EG KPAL KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RADEMAKER'S
FEBRUARY 14-17 VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary

11. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit for nonproliferation discussions. Nonproliferation has been a key agenda item in the U.S.- Egyptian bilateral relationship in recent months, and expanding our dialogue will facilitate greater cooperation. Because Egypt takes seriously its role as a regional leader on nonproliferation and its influence in multilateral fora in general, Foreign Ministry officials want to know that the U.S. values their expertise and respects their ability to influence decision-making on regional nonproliferation matters. Egypt's priorities for the talks are the Middle East WMD Free Zone and pressing Israel to accede to the NPT. Although our dialogue on these issues intensified during the lead up to the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting on referring Iran to the UNSC, the outcome of that meeting left MFA colleagues pessimistic about the prospect for progress. Despite the GOE's focus on Israel, these discussions serve as a launching point for engagement with GOE disarmament experts to pursue greater cooperation on a wide range of nonproliferation issues. End summary.

Egypt's NP Team

12. (C) Your counterpart, Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs Ambassador Naela Gabr, will lead Egypt's delegation for the discussions. An expert in multilateral issues and fora, Ambassador Gabr served at both the UN and at Egypt's mission in Geneva. Ambassador Gabr is not a nonproliferation specialist, and has focused largely on UN reform in recent months, with a particular interest in the Human Rights Council. Egypt's positions on UN reform issues are often at odds with our own. We expect that in the are often at odds with our own. We expect that in the bilateral discussions, Ambassador Gabr will rely heavily on the head of MFA's Disarmament Office, Dr. Hossam Aly. Dr. Aly, who assumed his post in the fall of 2005 after returning from a 12-year assignment in Vienna, is a nonproliferation expert. At the conclusion of the first day's discussions, you will meet Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. The FM has taken a greater interest in NP matters in recent months and was personally involved in pressing for the inclusion of language on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the IAEA resolution on Iran. He takes seriously Egypt's role in all multilateral fora, uses such fora to press Egypt's national agenda, and is proud of his ability to influence decision making. He will likely remind you of his influence in your meeting.

NPT Regime and the IAEA

- 13. (C) MFA's disarmament experts have expressed frustration that the U.S. does not press Israel to accede to the NPT. Despite reassurances that the U.S. supports the universality of the treaty, Egypt will argue that the U.S. ignores regional concerns about Israel while focusing exclusively on Iran. They regularly note that, without universality, there will always be an "Iran" working to counter the perceived threat from Israel. You can expect the Egyptians to express disappointment at what they saw as lukewarm U.S. support for language on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the TAREA resolution referring Iran to the UNSC. After the special meeting of the Board of Governors, a MFA disarmament contact complained that that the U.S. watered down the language proposed by the Egyptians to the point that it became meaningless. He also said the U.S. only agreed to the language because of strong pressure from the EU-3. The Foreign Minister may tell you that since Egypt voted with the U.S. to refer Iran to the UNSC, several members of Parliament have asked him why Egypt does not insist on more pressure on have asked him why Egypt does not insist on more pressure on Israel.
- $\underline{\mbox{\bf 14.}}$  (C) On the May 2005 Review Conference, MFA contacts complained that the difficulties arose because of poor coordination between the U.S. and Egypt before the conference. They complained that their team tried repeatedly

to engage with U.S. counterparts before the conference, and that their gesture was ignored. The underlying message is that Egypt takes seriously its role on nonproliferation and will remind us that it insists on being consulted and treated as a player.

## Other Bilateral Agenda Items

15. (C) We have briefed the MFA on both PSI and the EXBS program. The Egyptians were reluctant to accept the offer of assistance under EXBS because they did not want to undergo the initial "analysis" of their border control systems. On PSI, the Egyptians have asked for a more detailed briefing. They were initially unreceptive to what they perceived to be a request to cede sovereignty and do not read the Law of the Sea to support the initiative. They also resent the fact that they have not been invited to shape the Initiative. On the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the MFA team will reiterate that Egypt is not prepared to sign until the Israeli nuclear issue is addressed. Egypt's position on the Biological Weapons Convention also remains unchanged (signed but not ratified), and we have received no sign that they are prepared to reconsider. On demining, the Egyptians will update you on the status of their recently created Demining Secretariat, which prioritizes and coordinates all demining

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activities in the country. They may also request financial support. We believe the GOE needs to do more to coordinate among ministries on this issue and to raise money through private international demining channels.

Gaza

16. (C) Egypt continues to play a vital role in Palestinian security. GOE officials from several ministries have said that Egypt was genuinely surprised by the Hamas victory. They believe that Gazans voted against Fatah, but not necessarily for Hamas. The GOE has urged the U.S. to maintain its support for Abu Mazen, continue financial assistance to the Palestinian people, and find a way to deal with Hamas under appropriate terms. Senior Egyptian officials met Hamas representatives on February 7 and pressed the group to abide by existing agreements, forswear violence, and recognize Israel.

## Danish Cartoon Controversy

17. (C) Since the public reaction elsewhere in the Arab world turned violent, Egypt's leaders have leavened their condemnation of the cartoons with appeals that protests be peaceful. Egyptian diplomats have been urging the Danes to address this problem for several months and were among the first to protest the intolerance of these images at the OIC and in other diplomatic fora.